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Surprisingly, Gladwell concludes his
book with a story that showcases the
negative side of first impressions,
thin-slicing, and stereotypes—the impressive increase in the number of
women in professional orchestras. This
growth, especially in sections of the orchestra traditionally thought of as masculine, is attributed less to a growing
awareness of women’s rights than to the
introduction of “blind auditions,” in
which the applicants perform out of the
judges’ sight. Deprived of immediate
decision cues, the judges are forced to
base their decisions solely on musical
merit. Artificial or nonmusical impediments are removed, and women musicians are free to rise to their level of
competence. As examples go, this is
compelling in the extreme.
The merits of Blink are many. It is well
written, lively, and engaging. Gladwell
both explains the power of first impressions and demonstrates that there are
indeed people who can make very successful decisions based on minimal data
in next to no time. He also convinces
that such talents can be acquired, or at
least improved. Yet it is here that the
book loses cohesion and momentum.
Having recognized that “blink” decision making can be both positive and
negative, Gladwell offers no clear way
by which the former can be improved
and the latter minimized. Furthermore,
the people he identifies as good “blink”
decision makers are all experts. In many
cases they have been mastering their
fields for decades. For example, General
Van Riper’s success was due at least as
much to his expert knowledge of U.S.
military procedures, strategy, and tactics as it was to his ability to make snap
decisions. It is a pity Gladwell did not
pursue the question of experience
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a little deeper as, at least upon the surface,
his findings would seem to have applicability to such issues as officer-training
pipelines and criteria for command.
The fact that training can reduce the
negative impacts of stress in snap decision making is nothing new, especially
for those in the military. Whether it is
the Marines reacting to a convoy ambush or a warship’s combat systems
team responding to an air attack, realistic training is a critical component of
success. Gladwell’s work simply reinforces what soldiers and sailors have
long known: You fight the way you train.
While Blink will not make its readers
experts at snap decisions, it remains a
work of interest. For one thing Gladwell
rather conclusively demonstrates that
our individual personalities, our unique
experiences, and beliefs and values,
form an integral part of human decision making. Models that fail to take
this aspect of decision making into consideration are almost certain to be
flawed, and leaders who fail to understand the power of these attributes are
almost certain to be disappointed. Blink
may not provide all the answers, but the
questions it raises are most definitely
worthy of consideration.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Miller, Steven E., and Dimitri V. Trenin, eds. The
Russian Military: Power and Purpose. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 241pp. $25

The study of the Russian armed forces
has, like those armed forces themselves,
fallen upon hard times in the contemporary world. Therefore, this study is most
welcome. The editors and authors—
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Americans, Europeans, and Russians—
are all acknowledged experts, so it is
not surprising that all the essays are of
uniformly high quality. The editors also
deserve praise for including a chapter
on the defense economy; its evolution is
a telling indicator of Russia’s defense
policy and overall political economy.
The editors’ purpose is to illuminate
the conditions under which Russia’s
rulers have responded to the challenges
for reforming their armed forces.
Thus the chapters on defense reform
(by Pavel Baev and Alexei Arbatov) and
on the military’s sociopolitical conditions (by Alexander Golts) paint a devastating picture of an unreformed
military that instead of providing security has itself become a source of insecurity for Russia. That outcome stems
from underinvestment, politicization,
corruption, official neglect, and refusal
to attack the perquisites of the military
establishment’s leadership. Vitaly
Shlykov’s chapter on the defense economy rightly points out that the regime
has failed to break free of either the Soviet Union’s “structural militarization”
or the heavy hand of state control. Roy
Allison’s overview of Russian military
involvement in regional conflicts suggests that even after painful lessons that
military has only begun to learn what
contemporary warfare is all about. Rose
Gottemoeller ably traces both the debate over the role of nuclear forces in
Russia’s military structure and policy
through 2003 and the implications of
that debate as they had been revealed at
that point. Dmitri Trenin’s conclusion
reassesses the reasons why defense reform had failed through 2003 and addresses the paradox that though many
are calling for reforms, many others
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correctly observe that the system itself
is unreformable.
No one interested in tracing the evolution of Russian forces and defense policy through 2003 can go wrong with
this book. It is too bad that it was published when it was. Because this work is
part of a distinguished multivolume series on Eurasian security issues, its publication was part of a larger program
and could not be delayed, but beginning in 2003 and conclusively in 2004,
the logjam that had blocked reform began to give way. Defense spending and
training, including exercises, increased
substantially, and by 2004 the effects
were visible. Likewise, new operational
and doctrinal principles were introduced and accepted in 2003–2004. The
General Staff, which had frustrated
many reforms, was now firmly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, and
the chief of the General Staff, General
Anatoly Kvashnin, a tenacious bureaucratic operator but disastrous military
leader, was finally sacked. Major forcestructure reforms began and are still
continuing today. Had the authors
known of these trends, they could have
provided first-class assessments of their
significance.
However, some things are already clear.
Current reforms are occurring under
the rubric of the Russian term “reform
of the armed forces”—that is, changes
in force structure. These reforms, while
extremely consequential, do not constitute a total transformation. Indeed, the
defense economy remains too much of
a Soviet-like character and is subject to
excessive state control. All the armed
forces, including those of the Ministry
of Interior and intelligence agencies, are
unaccountable democratically, representing instead indispensable pillars of
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Putin’s neo-tsarist, authoritarian system.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense,
rather than embracing a professional
army, insists upon expanding conscription and enserfing thousands of men as
their ancestors were enserfed over a
century ago. Thus, until and unless defense reforms are carried out beyond
mere reorganizations of the force structure, Russia cannot have effective
armed forces, security, or democracy.
Until then it will remain tempted by
imperialism and military adventurism,
as in Chechnya, and fail to retrieve its
European vocation or achieve true integration into Europe. Under the circumstances, then, it would be a good idea if
the authors could be prevailed upon to
write a second edition that incorporates
the most recent trends. Then we could
derive maximum benefit from this splendid book that was published too soon.
STEPHEN BLANK

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Penna.

Mallmann Showell, Jak P. German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2003. 160pp. $29.95

In the almost thirty years since the public revelation that the Allies in World
War II broke substantial portions of the
German ENIGMA cipher system, Allied
codebreaking has become a staple of
our understanding of the Battle of the
Atlantic. Less understood are the parallel efforts of the German navy to break
Allied naval codes. The historical record of German codebreaking is comparatively fragmentary, many records
having been destroyed during or immediately after the war. German naval
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intelligence was smaller than its Allied
counterparts and left a smaller trace.
Still, the influence of these German efforts on the pivotal convoy battles of
the war has remained an important unanswered question. In German Naval
Codebreakers, Jak Showell, author of
more than a dozen books on German
U-boats, has attempted to provide an
account of signals intelligence in the
German navy in World War II.
The German Naval Radio Monitoring
Service (or Funkbeobachtungsdienst,
commonly abbreviated B-Dienst)
worked with some success against British and American naval codes. During
the early period of the war until 1943,
the B-Dienst could read large parts of
the Allied merchant ship and convoy
codes, which provided important insights into convoy operations and routing. In addition to codebreaking,
B-Dienst operated a network of direction finders that fixed the approximate
locations of radio transmissions in the
Atlantic.
Whatever its success at codebreaking,
the German navy in World War II
failed at the critical second step of intelligence analysis. Showell creates the impression that B-Dienst personnel were
separated from key operational commanders and were not permitted access
to information about their own forces’
operations. The B-Dienst was therefore
reduced to passing raw messages to senior commands, feeding the complaint
that radio intelligence served only to
provide a flood of useless information.
This arrangement stands in marked
contrast to the intimate relationship between commanders and operational intelligence centers in Britain and the
United States.

3

